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Abstract
This paper tracks the commitments of mechanistic explanations focusing on the relation between 
activities at different levels. It is pointed out that the mechanistic approach is inherently  committed 
to identifying causal connections at higher levels with causal connections at lower levels. For the 
mechanistic approach to succeed a mechanism as a whole must do the very same thing what its 
parts organised in a particular way do. The mechanistic approach must also utilise bridge principles 
connecting different causal terms of different theoretical vocabularies in order to make the identities 
of causal connections transparent.
These general commitments get confronted with two claims made by certain proponents of 
the mechanistic approach: William Bechtel often argues that within the mechanistic framework it is 
possible to balance between reducing higher levels and maintaining their autonomy at the same 
time, whereas, in a recent paper, Craver and Bechtel argue that the mechanistic approach is able to 
make downward causation intelligible.
 The paper concludes that the mechanistic approach imbued with identity  statements is no 
better candidate for anchoring higher levels to lower ones while maintaining their autonomy at the 
same time than standard reductive accounts are, and that what mechanistic explanations are able to 
do at best is showing that downward causation does not exist.
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CAUSATION AT DIFFERENT LEVELS:
Tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations
1. Introduction
We are in an era of mechanisms (again). There are enthusiastic people around us saying that 
mechanisms are everywhere. There is a mechanism explaining how keys open locks (Glennan 
2009), how the DNA gets replicated, or how chemical transmission happens at synapses (Machamer 
& Darden & Craver 2000). There are deep interconnected levels of mechanisms explaining the 
whole brain itself (Craver 2007, p. 7). In fact, some argue, causation per se (at non-fundamental 
levels) ought to be understood as a mechanism producing the appropriate effect (Glennan 1996). 
 This new mechanistic approach makes at least two points. The first point  is a methodologi-
cal one: it is argued that what scientists (typically  life scientists) do is exploring and identifying 
mechanisms. The second point is an explanatory one: it is claimed that understanding something 
properly  (and thus explaining a phenomenon adequately) amounts to comprehending the mecha-
nism responsible for the phenomenon.
 But sometimes a third point is also made. William Bechtel, one of the leading advocates of 
the mechanistic approach, argues that mechanistic explanations are able to reconcile two quite an-
tagonistic claims about the status of special sciences: their reducibility and independence (Bechtel 
2006, 2007, 2008). Contrary to the received view, according to which reductive ambitions are usu-
ally seen as threatening the independence of special sciences, Bechtel argues that these two ways of 
looking at the special sciences—once reformulated within the mechanistic framework—are in fact 
compatible.
In what follows, first, we shall focus on what mechanistic explanations say about causation 
at different levels. In particular, we shall analyse their explicit and implicit commitments concern-
ing the relationship between what a mechanism as a whole does and what the constituents as parts 
of an organised structure do. By showing that it is one of the fundamental tenets of the mechanistic 
approach that causal roles of higher levels are identical with certain causal roles of lower levels we 
conclude that, contrary to how it  is often put in the literature, the mechanistic approach deploys 
identity statements about causal roles and even relies on bridge laws.
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Second, we shall argue that these commitments ruin William Bechtel’s programme. The 
mechanistic framework is no better candidate for reducing higher levels (or special sciences) and 
maintaining their autonomy at the same time than any other reductive approach. We show that 
Bechtel’s reasons supporting the independence of higher levels are incompatible with the commit-
ments of the mechanistic endeavour.
Finally, we shall confront these commitments with a recent claim made by Carl Craver and 
William Bechtel (Craver & Bechtel 2007). They  argue that within the mechanistic framework it is 
possible to render the mysterious notion of downward causation intelligible via identifying it with 
so-called mechanistically mediated effects. We demonstrate that, due to its commitments to identity 
statements, what the mechanistic approach is able to achieve, at best, is explaining downward cau-
sation away—i.e. showing that the phenomenon as characterised by e.g. emergentists does not exist.
That is, we make and defend three claims. The first claim is a general one, which applies 
across the board to all versions of mechanistic explanations. The second and third claims, on the 
other hand, are particular critical notes targeting special applications of the mechanistic framework, 
and thus do not necessarily generalise over to other proponents of the approach.
2. The Mechanistic Approach
In this section we set the stage for our analysis. First, a general characterisation of the mechanistic 
approach is introduced, followed by a brief summary of the motivation behind and the main argu-
ments supporting the claims proposed by Bechtel (2006, 2007, 2008) and Craver and Bechtel 
(2007).
2.1 General characterisation
The mechanistic approach identifies a phenomenon via identifying the tasks performed—i.e. the 
causal roles played—by a system producing the phenomenon. The very point of the mechanistic 
approach is to explain a phenomenon by understanding the mechanism responsible for these tasks.
 Understanding the relevant mechanism consists in decomposing the system into parts, speci-
fying the properties and causal roles of the parts, and understanding the spatial and temporal organi-
sation of the parts. The mechanistic approach employs two interdependent building blocks for char-
acterising mechanisms: entities and activities. Entities are the parts composing the mechanism, their 
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activities are in virtue of what they  contribute to the working of the mechanism. A mere aggregate 
of entities and their activities is not a mechanism, however. Entities and activities must be arranged 
into a specific spatial and temporal order otherwise they would not be able to perform a certain task 
together. That is, the mechanistic approach tries to account for the phenomenon (the explanandum) 
in terms of the organised activity of the parts constituting the system.
 Consider Figure 11. S ψ-ing is the phenomenon in question. The arrows indicate how S ψ-
ing is connected to its context, i.e. to other entities at its level. According to the mechanistic ap-
proach, S ψ-ing can be accounted for in terms of the components X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5, and their 
activities (Φ1-ing, Φ2-ing, Φ3-ing, Φ4-ing, and Φ5-ing respectively) organised in an appropriate way. 
These entities and activities organised in the appropriate way constitute the mechanism responsible 
for the ψ-ing of S.
Fig. 1 The general scheme of mechanistic explanations.
S performs the task ψ-ing. On descending levels it is decomposed into the organ-
ised activities of its constituent parts.
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1 Figure 1 is based on Figure 2 in (Craver 2001, p. 66) and Figure 1.1 in (Craver 2007, p. 7).
 As it is shown on Figure 1, the mechanistic approach is a multilevel approach. Once the ψ-
ing of S is decomposed into the lower level organised structure of entities (Xi-s) and their activities 
(Φi-ing) it is possible to apply  the same methodology again in order to account  for the Φi-ing of Xi-s 
in terms of a still lower level mechanism. So, for example, the Φ3-ing of X3 can be accounted for in 
terms of the organised ρi-ing of some Pi. P1 ρ1-ing, P2 ρ2-ing, and P3 ρ3-ing (organised in an appro-
priate way) together constitute the mechanism responsible for the Φ3-ing of X3.
2.2 Bechtel’s way of defending autonomy
As we have seen, mechanistic explanations account for higher level phenomena in terms of lower 
level entities and activities. Questions concerning the relationship between these levels—especially 
if explanations at different levels utilise different  theoretical vocabularies, i.e. belong to different 
special sciences (cf. section 3.2)—thus naturally arise.
 In contemporary literature there is a number of different approaches to this problem. At one 
end of the spectrum, there is, for example, John Bickle, whose ‘ruthless reductionism’ argues that 
lower level accounts have an explanatory primacy in the sense that it  is the lower level account 
which really explains a higher level phenomenon—once lower level explanations are completed 
one does not need higher level explanations anymore (Bickle 2003, 2006). At the other end of the 
spectrum, there is Peter Menzies, who not just denies the explanatory primacy of lower levels, but 
even claims that higher levels are causally  autonomous—it is the higher level entity  rather than the 
lower level one which is, according to him, causally  efficient in bringing about a certain effect 
(Menzies 2003, 2010).
 William Bechtel tries to balance between these two extremes.2 On the one hand, he argues 
that the mechanistic approach is reductive since it decomposes higher level wholes into parts and 
accounts for the task it performs in terms of lower level entities and activities. On the other hand, 
though, he would also like to maintain the autonomy of higher levels by emphasising that informa-
tion about the lower level parts alone is not sufficient for understanding why a higher level whole 
behaves as it does (Bechtel 2007). He argues for this latter claim in the following way:
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2 Note that not all proponents of the mechanistic approach can easily be positioned along this continuum. Carl Craver, 
for example, by arguing for the so-called ‘mosaic unity’ of the sciences, implies that sciences are neither reduced to one 
another nor are they autonomous from each other, but rather equally contribute to the development of multilevel 
mechanisms (Craver 2007).
“The parts of a whole behave in a particular way because of how they are organized in 
the mechanism. Information about how the parts are organized goes beyond the account 
of the parts and their operations. Moreover, the mechanism interacts causally with other 
entities. These interactions provide the input and set the conditions for the mechanism 
and information about them is not part of the reductive account characterizing the parts 
and operations within the mechanism. Securing information about both the organisation 
within the mechanism and the relations between the mechanism and its environment 
requires going beyond the reductive aspect of mechanistic explanation and incorporat-
ing the results of other autonomous inquiries.” (Bechtel 2007, pp. 182-183, emphasis 
added)
 Basically, when arguing for the autonomy of higher levels, Bechtel relies on the claim that 
in order to explain a higher level phenomenon properly, one needs information only present at that 
higher level. First, Bechtel argues, organisational information, information about how the parts are 
spatially  and temporally  organised goes beyond the account  of the parts and their operations. Sec-
ond, contextual information about how the mechanism as a whole is related to other entities in its 
environment, is also something, which cannot be captured at the level of the parts and their opera-
tions.
 Consider, for example, identifying the mechanism responsible for the activity of the photo-
receptors in the retina (converting light into electrochemical signals). Electromagnetic radiation is 
absorbed by a photopigment in the membrane of the disks in the outer segment of the photorecep-
tors. Photopigments are receptor proteins (opsins) with a prebound chemical agonist (retinal, a de-
rivative of vitamin A). The absorption of light causes a change in the conformation of retinal so that 
it activates the opsin. This stimulates a G-protein in the disk membrane (transducin) which in turn 
activates an effector enzyme phosphodiesterase (PDE). PDE breaks down cyclic guanosine mono-
phosphate (cGMP), an intracellular second messenger which keeps the sodium channels in the 
membrane of the photoreceptor open. The reduction in cGMP causes the sodium channels to close 
and the photoreceptor membrane to hyperpolarize. (Cf. Bear & Connors & Paradiso 2001, pp. 283-
299; Kandel & Schwartz & Jessell 2000, pp. 507-515)
What Bechtel argues for is that comprehending e.g. molecular facts about retinal, opsin, 
transducin, etc. is not sufficient for understanding how the retina works. First, molecular level facts 
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about retinal, opsin, etc. carry no information about how these constituents need to be arranged for 
the retina to be able to convert light  into electrochemical signals. Second, molecular level facts also 
leave out facts about higher level context, i.e. how the retina itself is situated relative to the lens, the 
optic nerve, etc. These additional information are crucial—it is the specific spatial and temporal or-
ganisation of the molecular parts which allow them to trigger each other, and it is the specific way 
of being embedded in the organisation of the pupil, the lens, the ciliary muscles, etc. which makes it 
possible for the retina to do its job.
 That is, without organisational and contextual information it  is impossible to provide a suffi-
cient explanation of a given phenomenon. Since, according to Bechtel, a lower level account in it-
self falls short in capturing this information, it is insufficient to explain the behaviour of the whole 
mechanism. Thus—Bechtel concludes—higher levels are autonomous: they  capture crucial, and 
relevant information not captured by any lower level accounts. That is, it is not possible to account 
for all the facts solely on the basis of the lower level facts.
2.3 Downward causation through the spectacles of mechanistic explanations
Generally, downward causation is a phenomenon where a higher level entity  exerts causal influence 
on lower level entities. It is the central notion of emergence (cf. Alexander 1920; Broad 1925; 
McLaughlin 1992; Morgan 1923), and it is widely discussed both within the philosophical and the 
scientific literature. However, there is a certain sense of mysteriousness associated to the term. Even 
the question if downward causation is a coherent notion is hotly debated (Bedau 2002; Kim 1999, 
2000; Stephan 2002; Yates 2009).3
 From our present perspective the problem of downward causation is interesting because if 
entities at higher levels could exert causal influence on entities at lower levels then that would 
credit autonomy—in a quite strong sense—to higher levels. In a recent paper, Craver and Bechtel 
argue that the mechanistic framework is able to make sense of downward causation. Here we are 
interested in if their account contributes to the autonomy of higher levels.
Craver and Bechtel claim that the correct way  of understanding downward causation—and 
all other versions of inter-level causation—is to interpret them as a hybrid of inter-level constitutive 
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3 Especially its reflexive variety where a whole exerts causal influence on its parts.
and intra-level causal relations. They call these hybrids mechanistically mediated effects (Craver & 
Bechtel 2007).
 Their argument proceeds as follows. First Craver and Bechtel claim that the notion of levels, 
as it occurs in the context of inter-level causation, in fact stands for levels of mechanisms. This 
makes it legitimate to interpret inter-level causation from the point of view of the mechanistic ap-
proach. Next, it is claimed that within the mechanistic framework causation is strictly an intra-level 
relation. Entities of different levels of mechanisms are in a part-whole relation with each other—
mechanisms as wholes are constituted by the organised activity  of their parts. That is, levels of 
mechanisms are ‘levels of aggregation’, ‘levels of composition’ or ‘constitutive levels’ (cf. Craver 
& Bechtel 2007, p. 550). Constitution is not a causal relation. As Craver and Bechtel put it: “many 
common assumptions about the nature of causation preclude the possibility  of causal relation be-
tween parts (components) and wholes (mechanisms)” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 551). 
 Thus, literally, there is no such thing as inter-level causation. What there is instead—and ac-
cording to Craver and Bechtel what is usually  misinterpreted as inter-level causation—is the follow-
ing. First, entities of a given level exert causal influence on other entities of the same level. Second, 
these effects get mediated down (top-down causation) or up (bottom-up causation) to the next level 
via the constitution relation. E.g. affecting the behaviour of a component part affects the behaviour 
of the whole not because the part exerts a direct  causal influence on the whole but because the 
whole is constituted by  the organised activity of its parts. Since the activity  of every  part plays a 
crucial role in what the mechanism as a whole does changing the activity  of a part changes the be-
haviour of the whole.
 Consider the example of the previous section again. It  might be tempting to say that the eye 
transducing the visual stimulus into the language of the nervous system causes the hyperpolarisa-
tion of the photoreceptors thus evoking an inter-level causal connection between the eye and the 
photoreceptor. However, what the mechanistic approach points out is exactly that it is not the case. 
The eye transducing is a higher level whole which is constituted by the precise organisation of 
lower level entities (pupil, lens, ciliary  muscles, etc.), which themselves are constituted by the or-
ganised activity of still lower level entities, (e.g. photoreceptors) etc. The eye transducing the visual 
stimulus into neural activation patterns does not exert a causal influence on photoreceptors. Photo-
receptors are parts of the eye, their activity  (hyperpolarisation) contributes to the behaviour of the 
eye. Craver and Bechtel emphasise that the relation between the behaviour of a whole and its part 
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(say, between the eye transducing and a photoreceptor hyperpolarising)—contrary to the relation 
between entities causally  connected—is symmetric: the eye transduces because the photoreceptor 
hyperpolarises and vice versa (cf. Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 554). 
3. What Constitution Amounts to
The notion of constitution plays a central role within the mechanistic framework—as we have seen, 
the fundamental claim of the approach is that the organised activity  of the parts constitutes the 
whole. However, understanding what is meant by constitution within the mechanistic framework 
properly is not straightforward.
 Note that, on the one hand, proponents of the mechanistic approach evoke the constitution 
relation as an alternative to identity (cf. e.g. Craver 2007). To this extent, they are buying in a 
widely  held position. As it  is often argued, the lump of clay constitutes the statue, but not vice 
versa: the statue does not constitute the lump of clay. That is, constitution—contrary to identity—is 
an asymmetric relation (Baker 1997; Johnston 1992). On the other hand, though, constitution is 
usually  understood as an intra-level relation (cf. e.g. Paul 2007). Compare this with the way the 
mechanistic approach deploys constitution explicitly as an inter-level relation. The lump of clay and 
the statue are at the same level of composition/aggregation, whereas a whole and its spatially and 
temporally organised parts are at different levels of composition/aggregation.
 Moreover, consider how Craver and Bechtel claim, on the one hand, that it is constitution 
that relates a higher level with a lower level, whereas, on the other hand, they claim that the relation 
between levels is symmetrical. They say:
“The relation is symmetrical precisely  because the mechanism as a whole is fully  con-
stituted by the organized activities of its parts: a change in the parts is manifest as a 
change in the mechanism as a whole, and a change in the mechanism is also a change in 
at least some of its component parts.” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 554)
 Note, however, that the symmetrical relation in question holds between what the mechanism 
as a whole does and the behaviour of the spatially and temporally organised parts. That is, the 
symmetrical relation connects the activity of the whole and the organised activity of the parts. To 
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put it in another way, the proper answer to the question why a certain spatial and temporal organisa-
tion of parts constitutes a whole is that because the parts together do the same thing what the whole 
itself does. That is, the overall behaviour of the parts is identical with the behaviour of the whole.
  Let us unpack this in detail.
3.1 Identification of causal roles
Consider what the relation between the behaviour of the whole and the behaviour of the organised 
structure of its parts is. This question focuses on the causal role played (the activity performed) by 
the mechanisms as a whole and the causal role played by the spatial and temporal organisation of 
the parts.
 Remember how mechanistic explanations proceed. First, a certain phenomenon is grasped 
via the task performed by a system, then the system gets decomposed via the identification of its 
parts, their activity and organisation. The very point of the mechanistic approach is to explain how a 
system performs certain tasks by  understanding how its parts organised in the right way perform the 
very same task. Had the organised structure of the lower level entities performed an activity  differ-
ent from what the higher level entity performs, the account of what happens at the lower level 
would not have been able to explain the higher level phenomenon in question, and the organised 
activity of the lower level entities would not have constituted the higher level whole. In this sense, 
mechanistic explanations identify the activity of the spatial and temporal organisation of the parts 
with the activity of the higher level whole.
 That is, the very way mechanistic explanations proceed requires the activity of the organisa-
tion of the parts at the lower level to be the same as the activity of the whole at the higher level.
 Consider Figure 2, which is a slightly altered version of Figure 1. Figure 2 indicates certain 
activities of the entities playing part in a mechanistic explanation. Let’s say that the entity  at the 
higher level is connected to its context (other entities at its level) by  causal relations Ci, Cj, Ck4, 
whereas the lower level entities in question are connected to their context by causal relations Cl, 
Cm, Cn. These causal relations characterise the causal role played by the higher level entity and the 
organised structure of the lower level entities respectively.
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4 One who is subscribed to Shoemaker’s analysis (2003, 2007) might want to say that Ci and Cj represent backward 
looking whereas Ck represents forward looking causal powers of X3.
 The very fact that it is possible to explain the task performed by the higher level entity in 
terms of the organised activity of the lower level entities entails that the causal roles played at the 
higher level (Ci, Cj, Ck) and at the lower level (Cl, Cm, Cn) are the same. That is, for a mechanistic 
explanation to get off the ground the causal profile characterised by  Ci, Cj, Ck must be identical with 
the causal profile characterised by Cl, Cm, Cn. It is thus an internal consequence of the very way 
mechanistic explanations work that causal connections utilised to characterise the activities at dif-
ferent levels must be identical with each other.
Fig. 2 An inherent commitment of mechanistic explanations.
Causal connections Ci, Cj, Ck of entity X3 belong to the higher level L0, whereas 
causal connections Cl, Cm, Cn of the organised structure of entities P1, P2, P3 belong 
to the lower level L-1. The mechanistic approach must be committed to the claim 
that the higher level causal role characterised by Ci, Cj, Ck is identical with the 
lower level causal role characterised by Cl, Cm, Cn.
 Note that the organisation of the lower level parts would not constitute the higher level 
whole if their activities weren’t identical. That is, the constitution claim the mechanistic approach 
makes amounts to an identity claim: the causal role played by the organisation of the parts is the 
11
very same causal role what  is played by the whole. The conclusion what follows, then, is this: by 
claiming that the whole is constituted by  the organised activity of its parts the mechanistic approach 
inherently  commits itself to the claim that whatever the whole does is something what is done by 
the organisation of its parts.
3.2 Different vocabularies, bridge laws and identity statements
There is, however, something that seems to be in tension with the conclusion of the last section: lit-
erally, entities at  higher levels do different things than entities at  lower levels. Consider again our 
example of the descending levels of mechanisms responsible for the task performed by  the eye. E.g. 
at the level of the lens and the retina entities ‘focus light rays’ and ‘send neuronal signals’, whereas 
at the lower level of opsin and transducin there are activities like ‘closing ion channels’ and ‘hyper-
polarising’. What the claim that  at different levels entities do different things emphasises is the sim-
ple fact that e.g. whereas at the higher level there are no entities hyperpolarising, at the lower level 
there is nothing focusing light rays.
 Notice how different vocabularies are utilised in order to describe entities and activities at 
different levels. As one descends from level to level one needs to change the vocabulary of psy-
chology  to the vocabulary of anatomy, then to the vocabulary  of neuroscience then to that of mo-
lecular biology, and so on. In other words, it is hard to see how a task performed at  a higher level 
could possibly be the same as a task performed at a lower level because different vocabularies are 
used at different levels to describe entities and activities.
 However, it is possible to reconcile the observation that entities at different levels do differ-
ent things with the constraint that the mechanistic approach inherently  commits itself to the claim 
that the behaviour of the whole is identical with the overall behaviour of the organisation of its 
parts. What the mechanistic approach needs here are bridge principles. Even if the mechanistic ap-
proach subscribes to the functional model of explanation (cf. Craver 2001), which explains a phe-
nomenon via what causal roles it  fills, as opposed to the D-N model (explaining a phenomenon via 
deducing it from general laws and antecedent conditions), bridge principles, identifying different 
terms of different vocabularies, are still necessary  for dealing with specific inter-level relations. (cf. 
Fazekas 2009)
 The need for bridge principles is something Bechtel himself touches upon. He says:
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“Herein lies the explanation for the need for bridge principles in the theory-reduction 
account – different vocabulary is needed to describe what the parts of a mechanism do 
than is required to describe what the mechanism as a whole does. The appropriate 
bridge in this case, however, is not a set of translation rules, but an account of how the 
operations of the parts of the mechanism are organized so as to yield the behavior of the 
whole mechanism” (Bechtel & Hamilton 2007, p. 25, emphases added)
 That is, though Bechtel acknowledges that different vocabularies describe activities at dif-
ferent levels, and he also acknowledges that different vocabularies are dealt with by employing 
bridge principles in the theory-reduction (D-N) account, he still thinks that bridge principles are un-
necessary  within the mechanistic framework—all one needs is an account of the organisation of the 
parts’ activities.
 However, this is quite not right. It is not enough simply to describe the organisation of the 
constituents. An account of the organisation of the parts’ activities is still formulated in the vocabu-
lary  of the lower level (e.g. it talks about the spatial and temporal organisation of the transducin ac-
tivating PDE, the photoreceptor membrane hyperpolarizing, etc.), whereas the behaviours at the 
higher level are described in another vocabulary used at that particular level (describing how the 
lens focuses light, the retina converts light into neuronal signal etc.). 
Bridge principles need to be evoked here to connect the different vocabularies. These bridge 
principles express co-reference of different causal terms: they state e.g. that the term ‘the eye trans-
ducing light causes the optic nerve to signal’ refers to the very same causal role than the term ‘the 
photoreceptor hyperpolarises’. They express that the causal roles evoked by  descriptions at different 
levels are the same.
 The moral, then, is this. Mechanistic explanations need to incorporate proper identity state-
ments connecting causal roles (activities) at different levels.5 
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5 The fact that mechanistic explanations do use identity statements can nicely be pinpointed in some of the texts pub-
lished by the proponents of the account. For the sake of the example consider the following two quotes.
“In this sketch of events involved in remembering a lecture, I twice stepped down levels by appealing to an 
identity between the effect on a system and a change in constituents of the system. At the lower level the causal story 
was an ordinary causal one. Then I stepped up a level by appealing to an identity between the new operations within the 
mechanism and the way it behaved as a whole. At the level of the whole the story was again an ordinary causal one.” 
(Bechtel 2008, pp. 154-155, emphases added)
“And insofar as that non-functioning constitutes the general’s death, we explain her death. Notice that when we 
reach the state of the mechanism that constitutes the state of death,  we do not say, with Betty Crocker, that it causes 
death. It just is death.” (Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 557, emphasis added)
4. Identity Statements and Autonomy
Our analysis so far points out a commitment of mechanistic explanations: that the appropriate 
causal processes at  higher and lower levels must be identical with each other. This is a general char-
acteristic of all versions of the mechanistic approach. Now we turn our attention to the conse-
quences of this commitment. This section investigates how the commitment in question affects Wil-
liam Bechtel’s program of balancing between reduction and autonomy.
 As we have seen, Bechtel provides two arguments for the autonomy of higher levels. On the 
one hand, he claims that organisational information regarding the parts goes beyond the account of 
the parts and their operations. On the other hand, he claims that contextual information, i.e. infor-
mation about the interactions the whole enters is not part  of the reductive account characterising the 
components and their operations (cf. Bechtel 2007, pp. 182-183). In the following two sections we 
shall present why a commitment to identity statements cause problems for both arguments.
Before being immersed into the details, note that for Bechtel these two arguments provide 
the only support for maintaining the autonomy of higher levels. The most common source of sup-
port, the multiple realisability  argument, is not an option for him—Bechtel thinks that the multiple 
realisability  claim is mistaken, and argues in length against it (cf. Bechtel & Mundale 1999; see also 
Bechtel 2008 pp. 135-142).6 That is, he needs alternative criteria to support his autonomy claim. 
The organisational and contextual information based arguments play this role.
4.1 Organisation
We have objected Bechtel’s claim that instead of bridge principles connecting the behaviour of a 
higher level whole to the overall behaviour of its lower level parts all that  one needs is an account 
of how the activities of the parts are organised (cf. Section 3.2). Note that our objection relies on the 
assumption that (at least there are cases where) the organisation of the activities of the parts is cap-
tured in terms of a lower level vocabulary, whereas the behaviour of the whole is captured in a 
higher level vocabulary.
 This however is not what Bechtel thinks about organisational information. Recall what he 
has to say about the autonomy  of higher levels (cf. Section 2.1). Bechtel explicitly argues that in-
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6 Note that given Bechtel’s commitment against multiple realisability, identity of causal roles—since the mechanistic 
framework is subscribed to the functional model of reduction (cf. Craver 2001; Bechtel 2008)—implies the identity of 
the entities at different levels filling the same causal roles.
formation about how the parts are spatially  and temporally organised—i.e. the very organisational 
information in question—goes beyond the account of the parts and their operations.
 We think that Bechtel is wrong. To be more precise, we think that either Bechtel is wrong or 
he defends a trivial claim. The ambiguity derives from how one understands the term “reductive 
account characterizing the parts and operations within the mechanism” (Bechtel 2007, p. 183), for 
this is the term which refers to that lower level characterisation which—according to Bechtel—is 
unable to capture organisational information.
 One way to understand this term is interpreting it as a characterisation of individual lower 
level entities and their activities. According to this understanding, then, Bechtel’s claim reads as fol-
lows. Organisational information of lower level entities and their activities is not part  of the charac-
terisation of these entities as taken individually. This is the trivial claim. It is trivial because, 
whereas the accused characterisation is restricted solely  to individual lower level entities and the 
causal roles they fill, the shortcoming it is accused with is the inability  to account for spatial and 
temporal relations between these individual entities. Consider, again, our example. No matter how 
detailed description is given about the intrinsic properties of the iris, the pupil, the lens, the ciliary 
muscles and the retina, and the tasks they are able to perform individually, this description necessar-
ily  lacks all the information about how these entities are connected, what spatial and temporal struc-
ture they fit into, and what dynamical couplings take place between their activities.
 However, it does not follow that it is impossible to capture this information purely at the 
level of these entities. For there is another way  to understand the term above—as a full characterisa-
tion of the lower level. According to this understanding, the reductive account characterising the 
lower level involves everything that can be described in terms of the lower level vocabulary.  We 
see no reason why spatial, temporal and relational facts about the iris, the pupil etc. could not be 
captured in terms of the vocabulary of their level. On the contrary: it is exactly this level—as op-
posed to the higher level, as Bechtel claims—which is able to account for these spatial, temporal 
and relational facts, since it is the vocabulary of this level which readily possess the very terms 
‘iris’, ‘pupil’, etc., and thus is most naturally apt for capturing such facts. In fact, it seems that  it is 
impossible to capture the organisation of lower level entities at the higher level. Spatial, temporal 
and relational facts of lower level entities can only  be discovered and described by employing the 
methodology and vocabulary of the lower level. That is, if Bechtel’s claim is that information about 
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the organisation of lower level entities cannot be captured at the lower level then it is strictly false 
(or questionable at best, and in need for more support).
 The moral is that Bechtel’s organisation-based argument for the autonomy of the higher lev-
els does not go through. In fact, it attacks a straw man: it is true (though trivially) if one restricts the 
characterisation of the lower level to the characterisation of individual entities and their behaviour. 
However, we see no reason why the targets of this argument, reductive accounts, should restrict 
themselves to this ‘light’ way  of characterising the lower level. In fact, John Bickle (2003), who is 
at the extreme reductionist end of the reduction-autonomy axis (cf. Section 2.2) is quite explicit that 
lower level accounts are full in this sense: they characterise not only the entities taken individually 
but their relations as well. That is, full-blown lower level accounts incorporating everything de-
scribable in terms of the lower level vocabulary are left intact by Bechtel’s argument. 
 Bechtel might object here by further claiming that although providing a full description at 
the lower level is possible, it still fails to capture the relevant aspects of the organisation, since the 
whole functions properly only in the appropriate context, and this contextual information is not pro-
vided even by  a full-blown lower level description of the organisation. In this case, then, his first 
claim for the autonomy of higher levels collapses into his second claim.
4.2 Context
The second claim Bechtel makes argues for the autonomy of higher levels by stressing that contex-
tual information about how a higher level whole is related to other higher level entities in its envi-
ronment is inaccessible at the lower level (at the level of the parts).
 This claim reminds us to the previous one we have just discussed in the following sense. In 
the preceding section we have pointed out  that Bechtel is attacking a straw man by restricting the 
characterisation of the lower level to the characterisation of individual entities and their behaviour. 
He makes the same mistake again. Only in this case it  is not the relations between the parts of the 
whole what  he illegitimately  excludes from the characterisation of the lower level, but  other entities 
of the lower level and their activities. These lower level entities in question are not parts of the 
original higher level whole but parts of other higher level entities that are connected to the original 
whole.
 In other words, the mistake Bechtel makes here is misidentifying the supervenience base. In 
the case of organisational information it seems as though Bechtel asked the reductionists to explain 
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organisational facts solely on the grounds of facts about lower level entities and their activities as 
taken individually, but not their spatial and temporal relations. In the case of contextual information 
it seems as though he asked the reductionists to explain contextual facts about the higher level 
solely  on the grounds of facts about the lower level which exclude the so-called supervenience base 
of the context itself. Contextual information about the connections of the higher level whole super-
venes not just on the parts of the whole, but on other entities of the lower level as well—in fact on 
all those entities of the lower level which themselves are parts of other higher level entities being 
connected to the very whole in question.
 Consider Figure 3. It is an amended version of Figure 1. It  shows that just as the activity of a 
given higher level entity (in this case the Φ3-ing of X3) can be accounted for in terms of the organi-
sation of the activities of lower level entities (P1 ρ1-ing, P2 ρ2-ing, and P3 ρ3-ing), it is also possible 
to account for other higher level entities (e.g. X2 and X5)—in the very same way—in terms of other 
entities and activities at the lower level. Take, for example, our model case. In addition to account-
ing for how the retina works in molecular terms, it is also possible to account for how the iris can 
vary the size of the pupil, or how ciliary muscles adjust the shape of the lens in terms of the very 
same vocabulary of molecular biology.
 Remember, the mechanistic approach is committed to the identification of higher and lower 
level causal connections. At the higher level, there are causal relations connecting the higher level 
entities to each other. Each higher level entity can be accounted for in terms of the organised struc-
ture of lower level entities. The inherent commitment of the mechanistic framework implies that the 
causal relations connecting a higher level entity  to other entities at  that level are identical with 
causal connections connecting certain lower level entities constituting the higher level entity in 
question with other lower level entities constituting those higher level entities which the original 
higher level entity is connected with. The way lower level entities constituting one higher level en-
tity are connected to other lower level entities constituting other higher level entities captures the 
higher level context in terms of lower level facts. That is, along the lines of the identities of causal 
roles, it is possible to capture higher level contextual information at the lower level.
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Fig. 3 Context on lower levels.
Contextual information can be grasped on the lower level if lower level constitu-
ents of higher level entities providing the context are taken into consideration.
 One might object here claiming that our analysis above is in direct tension with some of 
Bechtel’s and Craver’s general remarks on the characteristics of mechanistic explanations. They 
both emphasise that the levels of mechanisms are defined locally. Bechtel, for example, claims that 
“because of the lack of a compositional relation between the subparts of two different working parts 
of the mechanism, the question of whether these are at the same level is not well defined” (Bechtel 
2008, p. 147). According to Craver, X and S are at  the same level of mechanisms only if X and S 
are components in the same mechanism, and neither the activity  of X is a component of the activity 
of S, nor vice versa. Defining levels of mechanisms locally entails that when two entities of the 
same level are further decomposed into parts then there is no warranty that the parts constituting 
one of the higher level entities are at the same level as those which constitute the other higher level 
entity (cf. Craver 2007, pp. 192-194). Since this is exactly what our line of thought above assumes, 
it seems that our argument for capturing the higher level context at the lower level is bound to fail.
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However, we think that there are good reasons for believing that locally defined levels can 
be extended in a way that it becomes intelligible to claim that constituent parts of different higher 
level entities are indeed at the same level.
First, consider what Craver and Bechtel (2007) say about causation. They  argue that causa-
tion is an intra-level relation (cf. Section 2.3). That is, if there were causal connections between en-
tities constituting different higher level wholes, then those two entities—and in turn all the constitu-
ent entities of both lower level mechanism responsible for the higher level wholes respective-
ly—would be at the same level even if originally they were defined only locally.
Second, the very same methodology  which is utilised when investigating what  lower level 
entities play a part in the mechanism responsible for the higher level phenomenon can just as well 
be utilised in order to test  if a lower level entity constituting a higher level entity is connected to 
another lower level entity  constituting another higher level entity  (which is causally connected to 
the first higher level entity). Note that such causal connections between lower level entities consti-
tuting distinct higher level wholes are well known: consider, for example, how molecular processes 
in the retina (partly constituting the eye) affect molecular processes in the optic nerve (partly consti-
tuting the nervous system).
Third, consider Craver’s own definition according to which two entities are at  the same level 
if they are components of the same mechanism. Compare this with Figure 3. True, the organised 
structures of the lowest level entities (lowest, as depicted on Figure 3, not in an absolute sense) are 
defined locally via decomposing different middle level entities. Nonetheless, pairs of the sets of 
lowest level entities (forming organised activities at the lowest level and thus being responsible for 
the activities of certain middle level entities) are components of the same mechanism responsible 
for the middle level phenomenon of a certain middle level entity affecting another middle level en-
tity (say, the Φ3-ing of X3 affecting the Φ5-ing of X5 on Figure 3). For example, molecular processes 
in the retina and molecular processes in the optic nerve together are components of the same 
mechanism responsible for the higher level phenomenon that the eye transducing light causes neu-
ronal activity in the nervous system.
 In fact, the conclusion that there is an extended lower level containing distinct constituents 
of causally  connected higher level entities follows from the fact  that the mechanistic approach is 
committed to the identity of causal roles. For the only way a lower level causal connection can 
really be identical with a higher level one is if the lower level entity  connected to the constituent of 
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one of the higher level entities being causally connected is indeed a constituent of the other higher 
level entity. Had it been a lower level entity whose activity  is entirely indifferent for the higher level 
entities in question, the lower level connection would not have been identical with the original 
higher level connection. This, in turn, guarantees that the lower entities causally connected at the 
lower level are constituents of the higher level entities respectively, and the fact that there is a 
causal connection between them guarantees that they are at the same level. The lower level ex-
tended in this way, then, would be able to capture the contextual information in question.
 That is, contrary to what Bechtel claims, it is possible to account for contextual information 
about higher levels in terms of the entities and activities of lower levels. What one needs in order to 
be able to do so is recognising that all lower level entities and activities corresponding to higher 
level contexts must be included into the lower level account.7
 Surely, one cannot tell what higher level processes are taking place solely on the ground of 
what one knows about the lower level. However, it is due solely to the difference in the vocabular-
ies describing the two levels. Once the required identity statements are in place one is able to infer 
to higher level processes from lower level knowledge. Bechtel is right that one needs the higher 
level as well—but only  for formulating identity  statements. And this is true of the more extreme re-
ductionist accounts denying the autonomy of higher levels (like classical theory reduction, Kimian 
functional reduction, or Bickle’s account—cf. Fazekas 2009) as well.
 That is, William Bechtel’s approach cannot maintain the autonomy of higher levels any bet-
ter than full-blown reductive accounts do. If one understands autonomy as claiming that in order to 
explain a certain phenomenon one needs the higher level as well, then, though true, it is a quite 
weak sense of autonomy. (Weak, since it is also true of even some quite radical versions of reduc-
tionism.) If, contrary to this, one understands autonomy as claiming that at higher levels it is possi-
ble to account for facts which cannot be captured at lower levels, then, though this is a more attrac-
tive and informative version of autonomy, it is simply not true that Bechtel-style mechanistic expla-
nations support maintaining the autonomy of higher levels in this sense.
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7 A somewhat similar point has been suggested by Megan Delehanty (2005) under the term of ‘mechanism extension’.
5. Identity Statements and Downward Causation
Finally, before concluding the paper, let us briefly  come back to downward causation and the ac-
count Craver and Bechtel (2007) provides. The previous section investigated the consequences of 
embracing identities of causal roles to Bechtel’s program. This section extends the investigation to 
Craver and Bechtel’s aim of making downward causation intelligible.
The basic claim Craver and Bechtel make is that downward causation (and inter-level causa-
tion in general) is intelligible. There is no mystery concerning how higher level entities affect lower 
level entities causally—as far as one appreciates the mechanistic framework, i.e. as far as one bears 
in mind that there is no direct causal connection between higher level entities and lower level ones. 
What there is, instead, is the constitution relation ‘mediating’ the effects of the higher level down to 
the lower level.
 Claiming that higher level causes mediated down to lower levels make downward causation 
intelligible seems to suggest that there is higher level causation ‘over and above’ (i.e. different 
from) the causation at the lower level. For what else could be ‘mediated’ down to the lower level if 
all causal connections present at the higher level already existed at the lower level?
 However, this picture is confusing given our analysis of the constitution relation and the 
commitment of the mechanistic approach to identifying causal connections at higher levels with 
causal connections at  lower levels. The mechanistic approach inherently identifies the behaviour of 
the higher level whole with the behaviour of the organisation of its parts. If so, then all the causal 
influence higher level entities are able to exert are already exerted by lower level entities.
 Therefore, downward causation can be made intelligible in only  one (quite restricted) sense. 
A cause affecting a higher level whole affects its parts because the cause in operation at the higher 
level is identical with a cause operating at the lower level affecting the parts in question. This, how-
ever, is typically not how downward causation is generally understood. The fundamental tenet pro-
ponents of downward causation defend is that there are novel causal powers at higher levels. Novel 
either in the stronger ontological sense that they are not even metaphysically  determined by the 
causal powers of the lower level, or in the weaker epistemological sense that they cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of the causal powers at the lower levels (Alexander 1920; Broad 1925; Kim 
1999, 2000; McLaughlin 1992; Morgan 1923; Stephan 2002; Yates 2009). Neither of these re-
quirements are fulfilled, though, within the mechanistic framework. The mechanistic ap-
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proach—contra the ontological understanding of downward causation—identifies higher level 
causal connections with lower level ones, and—contra the epistemological understanding—claims 
that the behaviour of higher level wholes can be accounted for in terms of the behaviour of their 
lower level parts. 
 That is, the mechanistic approach entails that downward causation, as it is usually under-
stood, does not exist. What interpreting downward causation within the mechanistic framework can 
achieve at best is explaining why people often think that those phenomena they  come across are 
cases of downward causation. Strictly speaking, the mechanistic framework is inapt to explain 
downward causation—it explains it away.
6. Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to track the commitments of mechanistic explanations re-
garding the relation between causal connections at  different level. We have shown that mechanistic 
explanations embrace identity statements identifying higher level causal connections with lower 
level ones. Next, we have investigated the consequences of this commitment to William Bechtel’s 
program of balancing between the reducibility and autonomy of higher levels. In the course of this 
endeavour, we have pointed out that locally  defined levels can be extended to contain entities which 
are not part of the locally  defined mechanism but constituents of higher level entities causally  con-
nected to the original higher level entity. Relying on this result, we have concluded that Bechtel, 
once giving up on multiple realisability  and being committed to ‘mechanistic reduction’ looses all 
resources to maintain the autonomy of higher levels. Finally, we have examined a recent attempt to 
interpret downward causation from the point of view of the mechanistic approach. We have made it 
explicit  that  the mechanistic framework entails the non-existence of downward causation—though 
it is able to show what it is that usually gets misidentified as downward causation.
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